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The scientific establishment is deeply concerned over a proposed regulation that 
would require data to be shared on projects that are federally funded. Specifically, the 
proposed amendment to OMB Circular A-110 would require data collected by researchers 
at universities, hospitals, and non-profit institutions to be shared with interested parties if 
(1) the data are produced as part of a grant or agreement funded by the federal 
government; (2) the data are used in a published study; and (3) the data or study is used in 
formulating a policy or rule. Parties could request the data under the Freedom of 
Information Act. The proposed rule responds to a provision by Senator Richard Shelby in 
the 1999 Omnibus Spending Bill that requires data generated under federal awards at 
universities and non-profit institutions to be available to the public. 
 
 This regulatory analysis develops an economic framework for evaluating proposals 
to provide greater access to research data. Our analysis also offers specific 
recommendations for improving OMB Circular A-110 as well as the broader regulatory 
process. 
 
 We argue that the economic analysis of sharing research findings can be separated 
into three parts: the impact of requiring public access on incentives to produce data, 
research, and innovation; the impact of that requirement on the quality of research; and the 
impact of required access on the efficiency and transparency of policy.  
 
 The economic analysis demonstrates that the standard property-rights framework 
used to justify time-limited property rights for the use of data is not sufficient for 
addressing broader problems in which research and data could be used to help inform 
public policy decisions. The value of sharing data for public policy must also be 
considered. A second conclusion is that traditional peer review done by scientific journals 
is not adequate for purposes of relying on research for major public policy decisions. A 
third conclusion is that scientists who are reluctant to share their findings are more likely 
to have errors in their analysis than the average researcher. A fourth conclusion is that 
requiring the release of data could slow the development of data and delay the publication 
of results.  
 
 Although substantial costs and uncertainty may be associated with greater public 
access to data, our analysis suggests that academic norms alone provide very limited 
access to scientific data. We recommend improving Circular A-110 by narrowing and 
clarifying the scope of the proposed regulation. The proposed regulation should apply to 
economically significant regulations that have an annual economic impact of at least $100 
million. In addition, we recommend that Congress create an agency that would be charged 
with replicating the findings of regulatory agencies before such regulations could be 
implemented. The recommendations concerning replication would require additional legal 
authority. Taken together, our recommendations would help lay the foundation for a 
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The scientific establishment is deeply concerned over a proposed regulation that  
would require data to be shared on projects that are federally funded.
1 Specifically, the 
proposed amendment to OMB Circular A-110 would require data collected by researchers 
at universities, hospitals, and nonprofit institutions to be shared with interested parties if 
(1) the data are produced as part of a grant or agreement funded by the federal 
government; (2) the data are used in a published study; and (3) the data or study is used in 
formulating a policy or rule. These parties could request the data under the Freedom of 
Information Act. If the agency obtains the data only in response to the FOIA request, the 
requester would be required to pay a user fee to the agency. The proposed rule responds 
to a provision by Senator Richard Shelby in the 1999 Omnibus Spending Bill and states in 
broad terms that any data generated under federal awards at universities and nonprofit 
institutions should be available to the public. 
Proponents of the rule argue that interested parties have a right to know the basis 
for a regulation; that recipients of federally funded research have an obligation to share 
their data; and that regulatory decisionmaking is likely to be improved by making data 
available to all interested parties. Opponents of the rule, including many in the scientific 
community, believe that the rule will substantially diminish the productivity of the 
scientific community, will expose scientists to unfair attacks, and place unnecessary 
burdens on the research community. They also argue that the rule could place severe 
restrictions on those researchers who might obtain their data only on guaranteeing 
anonymity to subjects.
2 Some opponents also argue that current legal protections and the 
peer review process are adequate for the purpose of regulatory decisionmaking. Further, 
researchers and institutions with ties to industry fear that forced disclosure of proprietary 
                     
1 Kaiser (1998, 1999). 




information will jeopardize their relationship with the private sector, which often requires 
a level of confidentiality as a condition for funding.
3 
The purpose of our regulatory analysis is to develop an economic framework for 
evaluating this and other proposals to share research data. We also offer some specific 
recommendations that could improve regulatory decisionmaking. While the focus of the 
Shelby provision is quite broad,
4 we restrict our attention to regulatory decisionmaking 
because that was a major motivation behind the legislation and because the potential gains 
from improving regulatory decisionmaking are large.
5 
 We argue that the economic analysis of sharing research findings can be separated 
into three parts: the impact of requiring public access on incentives to produce data, 
research, and innovation; the impact of that requirement on the quality of research; and the 
impact of required access on the efficiency and transparency of policy.  
The economic analysis begins with a standard analysis of the economics of 
property rights—similar to the justification used for providing patents. In the case of 
patents, an inventor has an incentive to develop a new product because of the likely 
returns he would receive under the terms of the patent, which usually grants an exclusive 
right to a particular invention or product for several years. The point of patents and other 
related policies is to provide adequate incentives for developing new ideas and products. 
Such concerns also arise in research that could be used in a public policy setting. Adequate 
rewards must be provided to the researcher to develop new knowledge, but that is not the 
end of the story. 
The rewards to an individual researcher must be balanced against broader concerns 
related to the quality of research. The replicability of published findings in refereed 
journals under the current peer review system is not something that can be taken for 
granted. Though publications have high standards, peer review almost never requires that 
reviewers reproduce the basic results. Providing greater access to data would provide an 
incentive to improve the quality of studies because researchers will be aware that their 
conclusions may be more easily checked for validity. 
                     
3 Ibid. 
4 McGinley (1999). 




Making data available before passage of a regulation offers important benefits to 
regulatory decisionmaking. First, making the information publicly available could improve 
the quality of information, thus leading to a decision that is more economically efficient.
6 
Suppose, for example, that the findings of the researchers were shown to be false before 
the development of a costly, environmental regulation. Then, the regulation could have 
been withdrawn or revised. Second, public access to data ensures greater transparency, 
which lends legitimacy to the regulatory process. Transparency is a valuable aspect of 
public decisionmaking in a democracy. 
  Although substantial costs and uncertainty may be associated with greater public 
access to data, our analysis suggests that academic norms alone provide very limited 
access to scientific data. We recommend improving Circular A-110 by narrowing and 
clarifying the scope of the proposed regulation. We also recommend that Congress create 
an agency that would be charged with replicating the findings of regulatory agencies 
before such regulations could be implemented. 
 The next section provides some background on the proposed amendment to OMB 
Circular A-110. In section 3, we present our economic framework. Section 4 summarizes 
our conclusions and provides recommendations for improving the proposed rule and 




Congressional concern over access to scientific results is not new. While a general 
consensus exists that publicly supported research at universities is worthwhile, that 
consensus has broken down periodically over substantive areas of research, accounting 
practices, and commercial activities on campuses. 
The current controversy over public access to data bears some similarity to the 
earlier debates over public rights in publicly supported activities, but its focus on 
regulatory concerns is different. 
In 1993, researchers at the Harvard School of Public Health published the “Six 
                     
6 Opponents of access may argue that it could lead to a less efficient decision, since the political process 




Cities Study” in the New England Journal of Medicine, which was funded by the National 
Institute of Environmental Health Sciences and the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).
7 The conclusions in that study about the health effects of fine particles played an 
important role in the air pollution standards that the EPA developed for particulate matter 
in July of 1997.
8 
Several congressmen and a number of industry organizations—all unhappy with 
the regulatory response to the study’s results—requested that the EPA obtain the data and 
then release it through FOIA. The EPA initially wrote to the Harvard researchers to 
request the data but subsequently agreed to an alternate plan proposed by the Harvard 
dean for academic affairs. The researchers agreed to give the data to the Health Effects 
Institute, an independent research institute funded by industry and the EPA, so that the 
institute could convene an expert panel to reanalyze the data. The results of this study are 
not expected to be available until June of 1999—two years after the regulation was 
finalized.
9 
In response to the difficulty of obtaining such data, Representative Aderholt (R-
AL) proposed legislation in 1997 that would have required any data generated from 
federal grants to be made public. His provision was defeated. A second attempt in 1998 to 
require the OMB to study whether sufficient public access to such data existed passed 
Congress as part of a spending bill. President Clinton vetoed that bill for other reasons. A 
similar provision, proposed by Senator Shelby (R-AL), finally passed in the 1998 Budget 
Reconciliation Act. The OMB responded to the provision with a proposed modification to 
the regulations that govern federal grants to universities and nonprofits that it issued 
February 4, 1999. 
 
Shelby’s provision states that 
 
the Director of OMB amends . . . Circular A-110 to require Federal awarding 
agencies to ensure that all data produced under an award will be made available to 
                     
7 Fumento (1997) and Kaiser (1997). 
8 This discussion is drawn from Thurston (1998) and Kaiser (1997). 








The OMB’s proposed rule considerably narrows Shelby’s provision, requiring that 
 
in response to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for data relating to 
published research findings produced under an award that were used by the 
Federal Government in developing policy or rules, the Federal awarding agency 
shall, within a reasonable time, obtain the requested data so that they can be made 
available to the public through the procedures established under the FOIA.
11 
 
Neither the Shelby provision nor the OMB proposal represents a broad departure 
from formal policy. Federal granting agencies typically state that results of research be 
published and data made available within reasonable periods of time. The data provisions 
have been applied loosely, however; more often, scientists make such information 
available as part of university norms and customs rather than in reference to grant 
conditions.  
Federal regulatory agencies, for their part, can typically obtain any data for use in 
developing policy or rules, without regard to whether the data collection was financed by 
a federal grant.
12 Moreover, once an agency has such data, the data can be accessed by the 
public, subject to the exemptions of FOIA. Thus, the key change in the proposal is that an 
agency must obtain data from researchers in response to a FOIA request to the agency; 
currently, an agency has discretion as to whether to request the data.
13 
The Shelby proposal and OMB’s proposed rule have generated a great deal of 
controversy. Congressman Brown (D-CA), the ranking minority member of the House 
Science Committee has proposed repealing the Shelby provision entirely, a position 
                     
10 Office of Management and Budget Salaries and Expenses, Fiscal Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations 
Act, Public Law 105-277. Both the Shelby provision and OMB’s proposed changes allow for the 
requesting party to pay a fee to cover part or all of the cost of producing the data. 
11 Notice of Proposed Revision of Circular A-110, 64 Fed. Reg. 5684, issued February 4, 1999. 
12 Elliott (1999). See, for example, Sec. 114 and Sec. 307 of the Clean Air Act.  




endorsed by NSF Director Rita Colwell.
14 Other critics have focused on a number of 
ambiguities in the proposal, including the specific definition of a publication, the definition 
of data, and whether FOIA adequately addresses legitimate privacy and secrecy concerns 
of scientists and universities. On the other hand, some critics argue that the provision is 
excessively restrictive and should apply to all data rather than merely to those the federal 
government uses to develop policy or rules. 
Our analysis focuses only on data used by federal regulatory agencies to develop 
policies and rules. While the more general access provisions contained in Senator Shelby’s 
provision could be valuable, our analytical focus was dictated by a belief that regulation is 
a critical area where sharing data could lead to substantial improvements in policy. 
 
3. The Economic Framework Analyzing the Impacts of Public Access 
 
The economic framework is designed to address the question of whether and when 
research data from universities and nonprofits should be made public.
15 We consider the 
impact of providing greater public access to data on three areas: first, the incentives of 
academic researchers to produce data, research and innovation; second, the quality of 
published research results; and third, the efficiency, transparency and legitimacy of the 
regulatory process.  
 
  A. The Impact of Greater Access to Data on Data 
Production, Research and Innovation 
 
 We can frame the incentive effects of the access rules in classical property rights 
terms. That framework is valid and provides a useful starting point, although it is 
incomplete. Specifically, it usually incorporates an inadequate conception of the role of 
university research in the innovation system in the United States today and ignores 
important benefits of public access. 
                     
14 ScienceScope (1999). 
15 While we focus on university researchers, our analysis also applies to other researchers at nonprofit 




Patent policies are based on the idea that some protection of intellectual property 
is needed to create incentives for innovation. Unlimited patent rights are thought to be 
inefficient and inappropriate because of the creation of a permanent monopoly. 
Conversely, no protection fails to provide an adequate incentive to develop new ideas and 
products. 
One can similarly argue that requiring release of data will depress its production. 
Private data confers an advantage on a scientist by increasing the number and quality of his 
publications—the fundamental standard by which university scientists are judged. Early 
publication of data may destroy the ability of researchers to complete their papers and 
publish before their peers. In some cases, a researcher will not collect the data in the first 
place.
16 
Even limited requirements for public access to data create problems. The proposed 
OMB regulation states that data may remain private until a study based on the data is 
published. But many papers are typically published from a major data set. One possible 
outcome of the OMB proposal is that researchers will delay their first publications until 
subsequent papers based on the data are also completed. Another possibility is that 
researchers may save some time and money by collecting more limited data—only those 
necessary to support one or a few publications—when a more comprehensive initial study 
could have been done for a modest additional cost. Neither of those outcomes is desirable. 
The proposed OMB regulation would restrict expanded access to scientific data 
collected on research projects supported by federal grants or agreements. It might be 
thought that such federal support would ameliorate the incentive problem discussed 
above, but that is not the case. The grants could solve the incentive problem if all that 
were needed was capital to produce good research. But research differs from standard 
“widget" production in that it is a highly speculative activity.
17 As is well known in the 
employment literature, additional monitoring and incentives are often necessary to induce 
                                                             
universities and who are treated equivalently under the OMB-proposed regulation. 
16 Other problems arise when subjects are reluctant to participate in studies if the data are made public. 
See Kaiser (1998) and National Science Board (1999). 
17 Here, we are concerned only with the incentive or efficiency effects of the public subsidy, not with 
whether it is fair for the public to retain ownership in projects it pays for. The latter consideration might 





an appropriate level of effort from researchers. 
The speculative nature of the research enterprise explains why researchers rarely 
work for simple wage contracts, even in the private sector.
18 The efficiency of such 
contracts depends on the ability of management to monitor fully and easily the activities of 
scientists. In fact, inventive activity is particularly difficult to evaluate on a day-to-day 
basis. As a result, companies routinely negotiate incentive contracts with employees who 
conduct research—that is, contracts that give employees an incentive to work effectively 
without requiring extensive monitoring by managers. Incentive contracts reward 
employees for outcomes, rather than or in addition to, paying a fixed wage. Examples of 
such rewards include prizes for inventions, sharing revenues from patents, and paying part 
of an employee’s compensation in stock options or other equity. 
Universities have adopted some of those reward structures for research that leads 
to patents or other commercial products.
19 In general, researchers are rewarded for peer-
reviewed publications, a somewhat attenuated form of performance-based pay.
20 The 
government could find it difficult and expensive to compensate researchers for lost or less 
important publications by paying for the preliminary research. But even if that were 
possible, the monitoring problem remains. University research is at least as difficult to 
monitor and assess as industrial research and probably more so. If scientists are no longer 
judged by the quality and number of their publications, the federal government, like 
businesses who sign ordinary wage contracts with their scientist-employees, will be hard 
pressed to evaluate grantees and allocate subsequent research grants. 
A more important problem with the view that publicly supported research can be 
easily placed in the public sector is that it ignores the actual structure of research in the 
United States. Intellectual property rights, when there is public and private cooperation, 
are inevitably the subject of difficult, intense negotiations. That is so because virtually all 
important innovations are joint products, depending in a fundamentally nonseparable 
manner on the activities of university scientists, the federal government, and a host of 
                     
18 Such arrangements hold more commonly for key research employees. 
19 In part, universities are concerned that without some kind of award for patents, university researchers 
will fail to disclose inventions. Usual arrangements include features such as sharing gross licensing 
revenues between the university and the inventor. 




commercial firms, banks, venture capitalists, upstream suppliers, and downstream 
customers. Research joint ventures and longer-term research collaborations among those 
different actors have become increasingly common and are actively encouraged by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF) and other federal agencies. 
Those agencies support the collaborations for several reasons. First, they want 
universities to provide matching funds for federal grants. In addition, they subscribe to the 
principle that interactive, collaborative research is an efficient way to encourage 
innovation. Such research focuses university scientists on important problems and 
facilitates technology transfer from universities to industry. Furthermore, that research 
provides businesses with access to fundamental science at a time when industry, in the face 
of increasingly competitive, open markets, has significantly reduced intramural investments 
in basic science. Universities cannot be characterized as stand-alone entities that produce 
ideas that private companies subsequently commercialize.
21 As this brief description 
suggests, identifying the federal component of a project can be somewhat arbitrary. 
Moreover, requiring early public access to the arbitrarily defined federal part of the project 
may be problematic for the entire enterprise. 
Not surprisingly, one of the more difficult problems that industry, universities and 
the federal government have confronted in organizing collaborative research concerns the 
assignment and sharing of intellectual property. Universities, industry, and some federal 
agencies have been involved in developing contracts and procedures about when and how 
much data will be released from the projects, how proprietary data will be protected, and 
how best to use opportunities to file patent applications. Since 1980, the federal 
government has largely pursued a very flexible policy regarding patent rights to activities 
that involve federal funds, and the federal courts have liberally interpreted the ability of 
universities to patent the fruits of scientific activities. Those policies have been important 
to the research collaborations as they allow for relatively clear definitions of ownership, 
and enable protection of intellectual property in the related commercial products. 
Universities are now very active in patenting and licensing activities, although only 
                     
21 That view of U.S. universities was probably never correct. But the caricature is less true today than any 
time in the past thirty-five years and is rapidly becoming less so. See, e.g., Mowery and Nelson (1998), 





a few make significant amounts of money in royalty payments.
22 Industrial support for 
academic research—increasingly provided with some kind of condition that the sponsor 
have differential access to inventions arising from associated projects, such as the right of 
first refusal for an exclusive license—constituted 7.5 percent of all academic research in 
1995.
23 
The commercial activities at universities have been subject to considerable 
controversy, in part because of claims that traditional university norms of scientific 
openness have been compromised.
24 The provisions for public access to data generated 
under federal grants may pose serious problems for that fairly substantial and increasingly 
important research structure. The proposed regulation for data access introduces potential 
complications and uncertainty, which may reduce the productivity of the university-
industry-government collaborations. 
This subsection emphasizes the costs of requiring public access to research data. 
Requirements that data be made public are likely to have an adverse impact on the 
production of the data. That conclusion is independent of who pays for the research—the 
federal government or some other entity. Moreover, the efficiency loss remains even if the 
requirement is narrowed to requiring that data be produced after publication. Finally, a 
broad requirement for public access to data is problematic and of potentially large 
consequence for the collaborative activities of universities. 
Although we have emphasized costs, public access has important benefits as well. 
We discussed those that relate strictly to the academic enterprise—that is, production of 
more research or science—above. In the next subsection we turn to other categories of 
benefits. 
 
  B.  The Impact of Public Access to Data on the Quality of Scientific Studies 
 
                     
22 According to Zilberman (1999), the top five universities for royalty revenues in 1995 were the 
University of California system ($57 million), Stanford ($39 million), Columbia ($33 million), Michigan 
State ($15 million), and the University of Wisconsin ($12 million). The University of Virginia ranked 
tenth in royalty payments and earned less than $5 million in 1995. See Zilberman (1999). 
23 National Science Board (1998). 





The property rights framework starts with the assumption that data contain 
information more valuable to a scientist if he or she has exclusive access to it, and that 
policy requires balancing that value against the inefficiencies generated by the exclusivity. 
If benefits from diffusion are very large, the framework would recommend that data be 
made public. The more common outcome, however, would be for a balancing of the 
factors to lead to limited exclusivity, much like patent rights are limited in scope and time. 
Public access to scientific data, however, is a long-standing norm among scientists, and is 
based on a different logic. Specifically, a scientific conclusion may be inaccurate, and 
hence, making it available for scrutiny by peers (or, more generally, the public) will allow 
the legitimacy of the scientist’s conclusions to be tested or evaluated. The scientific norm 
of “openness” is institutionalized in the policies of many academic journals, which require, 
in theory, that data used in producing articles be made available to peers wishing to 
replicate the results. 
The university community does not accept the notion that peer-review before 
publication constitutes a sufficient check on the validity of scientific conclusions. Journals 
do not take responsibility for the accuracy of papers, beyond attempting to provide 
reasonable reviewers.
25 
 Indeed, errors in published papers are probably widespread. In the early 1980s, a 
now-famous study requested the data used in every published paper (with statistical 
analyses) published in The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, a leading economics 
journal. The study authors found errors in nearly every paper that were sufficiently serious 
that the results could not easily be replicated. The authors also found that, notwithstanding 
both the general norm that data be available and the requirement of the National Science 
Foundation that data be produced on NSF-funded projects, their requests for data were 
ignored, denied, or otherwise frustrated in a substantial number of cases.
26 Another study 
in the British Medical Journal gave a paper with eight deliberate errors to 420 people to 
review. For the 221 reviewers that responded, the maximum number of errors detected 
was five, the median was two, and 16% of the respondents did not find any.
27 
                     
25 For an interesting analysis of potential biases in the review process see Rennie (1998). 
26 Dewald, Thursby, and Anderson (1986). 





 As discussed above, university scientists, especially in the biomedical fields, have 
become involved in activities with potential commercial applications over the past two 
decades. A growing concern exists over conflicts between the incentives produced by 
commercial possibilities and the openness norms of science. The recent controversy and 
discussion within the community suggest that the procedures for ensuring scientific 
credibility are strained by the possibility of commercializing results.
28 
Academic enforcement of the openness norm is largely a matter of self-regulation. 
The seriousness of peer review and the extent to which journals promote access to data 
appear to be correlated with a discipline’s view of the quality of journals. Generally, 
publication in the best journals is rewarded more highly than publication in the second-tier. 
But the system, as is common with much self-regulation, relies on the cooperation of 
scientists. Unfortunately, the structure of the system includes an adverse-selection bias. 
The bias works as follows: if a researcher's conclusions cannot be replicated, and 
if, in fact, the conclusions can be shown to be seriously in error, the researcher suffers 
embarrassment and loss of reputation. Suppose that researchers have private information 
about how reliable and robust their own conclusions are. We expect that data are least 
available from those individuals whose assessment of their work is that it is unreliable. 
Such studies might be published in peer-reviewed journals, although perhaps in less 
prestigious ones. Eventually, the data might need to be produced. 
But enforcement at many so-called leading journals is clearly lax, so that very 
substantial delays may occur in the production of data. Thus, it is probably the case that 
the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking project reports error rates that are biased 
downward, since the subset of authors who did not make their data available to the study 
probably had higher error rates. That raises the unsettling prospect that problems are most 
likely to exist among the studies of those least willing to cooperate in the self-enforcement 
of the openness norm. 
An increasing number of the most prestigious journals, such as Nature, Science, 
and American Economic Review, now require data availability as a condition of 
publication. Requirements vary by field and by journal. Some require that data be posted 
                     





at the journal. In other journals the conditions appear weaker.
29   
The discussion of the problems with access to data and the need for improved 
accountability
30 lead us to conclude that the problems quantified in the economics 
discipline broadly characterize access to data in academia. Providing access to data once a 
study is published is widely recognized as appropriate behavior. It is, however, a standard 
from which academicians regularly fall short. 
 
  C.  The Impact of Access to Data on Regulation 
 
Our discussion so far has considered the extent to which academia encourages 
public access to and the sharing of data. The question arises as to whether such access is 
sufficient for regulatory purposes, as specified in the proposed OMB rule. Considering the 
benefits of access in a regulatory context changes its desirability in several important ways. 
 First, one benefit of providing greater access is to increase the likelihood that a 
mistake is found in an analysis. If the analysis is the basis of a regulatory strategy, then an 
error may be extremely costly. The particulate matter standard provides a good example. 
Projected to cost from $9 billion to $37 billion annually, that regulation will give the EPA 
vast new powers to regulate a variety of sources ranging from power plants to 
barbecues.
31 In many cases, it will be impossible to meet the standard with known 
technology. An analysis that casts doubt on the science could have changed the outcome 
of the regulatory process, saving billions of dollars.
32 Moreover, if a proposed regulation 
entails irreversible costs, the importance of a solid scientific basis and analysis is higher 
still. Frequently, once a regulation is passed, it becomes more difficult to modify because 
constituencies grow in support of the regulation, both inside and outside government. 
Thus, if the strategies involve large expenditures by consumers or businesses, large 
                     
29 For example, Cell requires that data be made available when there are disputes. 
30 George Thurston, a vocal opponent of the Shelby provision and the federally enforced data requirements 
in general, warns that without greater responsibility for accuracy by journal editors, outside regulation 
might occur. See Thurston (1998). 
31 Environmental Protection Agency (1997). 
32 Analysis does not always play a critical role in changing regulations because political concerns 
frequently override objectives related to economic efficiency or scientific merits. Nonetheless, in specific 





bureaucracies to regulate or enforce the regulations, or other significant investments or 
expenditures, then the value of greater public access could be substantial. 
 A second benefit of making data widely available is to enhance the transparency of 
the regulatory process. The process is improved through enhancing its legitimacy, and 
enforcement is improved if the process by which regulations are formulated is generally 
perceived as fair. We cannot quantify the value of transparency, nor do we have a good 
idea of how it trades off against the disadvantages of access discussed above. We do, 
however, consider transparency to be important and valuable. At a minimum, it suggests 
that when data are used to formulate important regulations, uncertainties about the 
appropriate policy should be resolved in favor of access. 
 Two implications follow immediately from our discussion of the regulatory 
context. First, for at least some major regulations, public access may be more valuable in a 
regulatory setting than within academia. The tradeoff between the desirability that data 
remain in the hands of the researchers and the social interests in allowing access shifts 
toward access. Second, our analysis of the value of public access to data used in 
regulatory proceedings applies to any scientific data, not just data derived from federal 
grants or data collected by researchers at universities and nonprofit institutions. 
 Currently, regulatory agencies can obtain the underlying data for studies used in 
setting regulations. In addition, if an agency has obtained the data, it can be compelled to 
provide them to interested parties under the provisions of the Freedom of Information 
Act, which exempts certain categories of information. The excluded categories appear to 
include information that critics of the proposed OMB rule have been primarily concerned 
about, including identifying medical records and proprietary information. But it does not 
appear that the existing provisions routinely provide more access than that available within 
the norms of academia. In particular, agencies appear to have considerable latitude to 
determine the need to obtain underlying data.  
 In Endangered Species Committee of the Building Industry Association of 
Southern California et al. v. Bruce Babbit,
33 the decision of the Department of the 
Interior to list the California gnatcatcher as a threatened species under the Endangered 
                     





Species Act was set aside by the District Court of the District of Columbia. Raw data 
underlying a study used by the Department of Interior were not made available to the 
plaintiffs. The Court states that 
 
where an agency relies upon data to come to a rulemaking decision, it generally 
has an obligation under the APA to provide such data for public inspection. (852 
F. Supp. 32 at 36). 
 
That case appears unusual, however, because the author of the data had published two 
conflicting studies based on the same data set. Thus, the analysis in the study used by the 
Department of the Interior was subject to particular skepticism. In general, the courts 
appear reluctant to abandon deference to agencies as to whether some data were critical to 
a regulation and had to be produced. For example, three years later the same court, ruling 
on a different endangered species dispute between similar parties, ruled that 
 
[Fish and Wildlife Service]’s erroneous failure to make available for notice and 
comment study relied upon in final rule did not rise to level of arbitrary and 
capricious action. (979 F. Supp. 893 at 893)
34 
 
 We cannot predict whether the judiciary will choose to interpret the Administrative 
Procedure Act narrowly or broadly with respect to the production of data. One possibility 
is that the requirements will be similar to those of the biomedical journals; that is, that 
production would be required in the event of a specific dispute or contradiction. Thus, it is 
plausible that the scientific peer review standards will be applied to the regulatory context. 
Our analysis suggests that this may be inadequate. We have no way of determining 
whether the current peer review standards are in fact adequate, excessively stringent, or 
overly lax for academic purposes, although we join others in the scientific community in 
stressing that peer-review is not a guarantee of accuracy. We can conclude, however, that 
if the academic standard is appropriate for academic purposes, then it is excessively low 
                     
34 Building Industry Association of Superior California et al. v. Bruce Babitt et al., Civ. No. 95-0726 





for at least some regulatory purposes. 
 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 This regulatory analysis argues that the issue of requiring data to be shared to aid 
in the development of public policy can usefully be analyzed by considering an economic 
framework that consists of two parts: the standard property rights analysis used for 
providing appropriate incentives for producing new research and an analysis of the impact 
of greater access for both academic and public policy purposes. 
The economic analysis demonstrates that the property rights framework is not 
sufficient for addressing broader problems in which research and data could be used to 
help inform public policy decisions. The need for sharing data to increase their value for 
public policy must also be considered when developing appropriate incentives to produce 
research. 
 A second conclusion is that traditional peer review done by scientific journals is 
not adequate for purposes of relying on research for major public policy decisions. That is 
not to say that peer review is inappropriate for the purposes of journals or scientists but 
simply that it does not guarantee the validity of the results to the extent that may be 
appropriate for at least some regulatory settings. 
 A third conclusion is that the problem of adverse selection could mean that 
scientists who are reluctant to share their findings are more likely to have errors in their 
analysis than the average researcher. We do not wish to push this result too far because a 
researcher may have many reasons for being reluctant to share data. But researchers who 
are confident in their findings would be more likely to share data than those who are less 
confident when other things are equal. 
 A fourth conclusion is that releasing data may have significant efficiency costs. 
Those costs include possible disincentives to produce data and to delay publication of 
results. In addition, the effect the requirements might have on efforts of universities, 
industry, and federal agencies to engage in collaborative research is unclear. Other critics 
of the proposed rule and the Shelby provision have emphasized more direct costs: the cost 





scientists instead of for legitimate participatory reasons. We agree that those concerns are 
not trivial. 
 In short, the Shelby provision and the proposed amendment to OMB Circular A-
110 address a legitimate public policy issue that we think is a problem. The question is 
what to do about it. Our first six recommendations offer modest suggestions directly 
related to the Shelby provision and the proposed revisions to Circular A-110. The 
remaining two recommendations directly address the problem of replicating regulatory 
analyses, which we think is fundamental to enhancing regulatory accountability. 
 
Recommendation 1: The proposed regulation should be restricted to economically 
significant regulations developed by executive and independent regulatory agencies.
35 
 
Discussion: Targeting economically significant regulations is likely to yield those with the 
greatest potential efficiency gains. We include independent regulatory agencies because we 
believe there are also potentially great efficiency gains from allowing public access to data 
used in promulgating those rules. 
The reason for restricting attention to economically significant rules is that the 
proposed rule will have costs, and we have concerns about how the rule is likely to be 
used in practice. Thus, we believe that it is important to begin by focusing on those rules 
where data sharing could have the highest payoff. One potential problem of concern is that 
the government may have market power in dealing with some researchers who have few 
other options for obtaining support. 
 The definition of economically significant is critical. We believe that a reasonable 
cutoff point is to include rules that have an annual economic impact of at least $100 
million.
36 Initially, however, a higher cutoff, such as $500 million could be used to 
determine whether the rule is likely to have significant adverse consequences. 
 
Recommendation 2: The proposed regulation should be limited to new federally funded 
grants and agreements. 
 
                     
35 Current regulatory oversight by the OMB does not include independent agencies. 





Discussion: The government signed grants and agreements with researchers and should 
abide by the terms of those agreements or at least not impose major additional costs on 
researchers without compensation.  
 
Recommendation 3: The terms of new federally funded grants and agreements that fall 
under the new regulation should be restricted to data used in published research in 
refereed journals that are directly related to the grant.
37 
 
Discussion: The government should interpret the scope of the regulation narrowly. 
Academic researchers will tend to get more benefit if the publication is refereed than if it is 
not. 
 
Recommendation 4: The researcher should be required to provide as full a rendering of 
the data set as possible. 
 
Discussion: There is a natural tendency in some research fields, such as economics, to 
report results that are statistically significant or that will increase the chances for 
publication, even if they tell only part of the story. Sometimes, potentially important 
variables are left out of the analysis. A researcher should provide as full a rendering of the 
data set as possible so interested parties can check the validity of the results. 
  
Recommendation 5: A researcher should get compensated for reasonable incremental 
administrative costs of producing a clean data set. 
 
Discussion: Under Circular A-110, a user fee would be paid to the agency that fulfills the 
FOIA request. At a minimum, a researcher should get compensated for reasonable 
administrative costs.  
 
Recommendation 6: The new rule, if implemented, should be evaluated five years later by 
an expert panel selected by the National Academy of Sciences.
 38 
                     
37 The definition of published research is a delicate issue. That is an important problem but beyond the 
scope of this analysis. Because we recommend an incremental approach, we would start with refereed 
journals, but that may be too narrow and should be revisited soon. The rules of publication are changing, 
particularly with the Internet.  






Discussion: The panel should include academics who can evaluate the economic, social, 
and scientific impacts of the regulation. The panel should provide recommendations for 
improvement. 
 
Recommendation 7: Congress should create an independent agency or one that reports 
to Congress directly to replicate findings for economically significant regulations that have 
an annual economic impact of at least $100 million.
39 
 
Discussion: Agencies with particular missions, such as promoting the environment or 
protecting public health, may frame analyses in such a way as to further their particular 
agendas.
40 To help avoid such bias, a separate agency should be charged with replicating 
the results of the analysis developed by the agency promoting the regulation. 
 
A law would be needed to create such an agency. Currently, there is a bill in 
Congress to set up a Congressional Office of Regulatory Analysis.
41 That office could 
serve that function. Alternatively, an independent agency could be created.
42 We feel 
strongly that the responsibility for replication and quality control should not be placed 
within the executive branch because there is a greater likelihood that the “independent” 
analysis would be biased. 
If Congress objected to setting up a separate agency to perform that function, it 
should consider asking an existing agency, such as the Congressional Budget Office or the 
General Accounting Office, to perform the replication function. Staffing would have to be 
modified accordingly. 
 
                                                             
FOIA requests themselves. If research suggested that the negative consequences were thought to be 
significant, then a more modest proposal, such as having an independent agency or group analyze the data 
and check the validity of the findings, may be a reasonable solution.  
39 That solution borrows from Breyer (1993), but it differs from his in that our focus is not on the 
executive branch. Moreover, his proposal to create a kind of technocratic elite within the executive branch 
is more ambitious.   
40 Breyer (1993) refers to that problem as one of “tunnel vision.”   
41 For an analysis of that proposal, see Hahn and Litan (1999).  
42 Replication could also be done by independent third parties, but we believe that it is best to have the 





Recommendation 8: Government should be allowed to use research findings for 
economically significant regulations only after the findings have been replicated by the 
agency created by Congress. 
 
Discussion: Replication is a key to ensuring the quality of results. Replication should 
require a finding by the newly created agency that the basic conclusions drawn from the 
data are supported by the data.
43 The data would be given exclusively for the use of the 
agency charged with replication. 
 
The requirement that replication be done before promulgation of the regulation is 
critical. While replication could result in delay, the delay could be minimized if the agency 
doing the regulatory impact analysis efficiently managed the transfer of the data and 
models. Exemptions could be provided for situations in which regulations are necessary to 
respond to emergencies; but such exemptions should be used sparingly. Because of the 
difficulty attached to changing a poor regulation once it is already in place, the benefits of 
such replication for improving regulation are likely to be large. 
The creation of an agency would impose some additional modest costs on 
taxpayers. The government would need to pay for the data and replication efforts to 
ensure the quality of its findings. We believe that such expenditures are well worthwhile 
for economically significant regulations.  
Compensation for researchers would be similar to that described in 
recommendation 5, except that it would apply to all research that was necessary for 
replication. Incremental costs should be interpreted broadly to include the costs of a 
researcher’s time in helping to clean the data set.  
 The recommendations would provide greater access to certain kinds of data used 
for publications that receive federal funding. That raises an important issue. Are there 
situations in which the government should provide other information on regulations to the 
public? And if so, what kind of compensation should be provided to researchers or 
individuals who produce that information? 
                     
43 The replication exercise could be defined narrowly in terms of reproducing the results of the initial 
research or policy analysis. We would prefer to define it a little more broadly, though that may make it 





 We think that there will be cases in which the government should provide greater 
public access to other key information not covered by the recommendations. They include 
situations where data are central to an analysis supporting an economically significant 
regulation, but the data are not required to be shared. In such cases, we think that the 
government should provide compensation to the producers of that information on the 
basis of its market value, which may be difficult to determine. There are two principles 
here: first, the public should have greater access to critical data underlying important 
regulatory decisions to help increase the transparency and legitimacy of decisionmaking; 
and, second, the government should not be able to take property from individuals without 
providing reasonable compensation.  
 The question of how best to address the issue of data sharing for public policy is 
complicated. We have attempted to provide a useful economic framework for analyzing 
the issue. Even if one disagrees with our specific recommendations, we hope that the 
framework is useful. 
 Although substantial costs and uncertainty may be associated with greater public 
access to data, our analysis suggests that academic norms alone provide very limited 
access to scientific data. We recommend improving Circular A-110 by narrowing and 
clarifying the scope of the proposed regulation. In addition, we recommend that Congress 
create an agency that would be charged with replicating the findings of regulatory 
agencies before such regulations could be implemented. Taken together, our 
recommendations could help lay the foundation for a regulatory system that is more 
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